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Abstract
In its life cycle, an enterprise may experience periods of crisis. If the crisis is monitored 
promptly and appropriate measures are taken, not only may the enterprise continue 
to operate but it may also be able to seize opportunities for growth. The Italian leg-
islator is introducing a procedure aimed at supporting companies to detect the very 
irst warning signs of a crisis. The supervisory board of auditors, the audit irm, and 
certain qualiied creditors will have the right and duty to start the early warning pro-
cedure (“allerta”). The board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) plays a fun-
damental role: its ex-ante supervisory and control activities over management allow 
it to efectively play an important role as main recipient of any crisis warning signs. 
The new regulatory framework lays down certain indicators and critical thresholds, 
which may trigger the alert process. Initially, the Delegated Legislation (Bill No.3671-
bis) sets forth certain speciic inancial indicators. The new bill (Crisis and Insolvency 
Code) on the contrary refers to a more complex and sector-speciic system of indica-
tors. The indings of an empirical research conducted by analysing a sample of more 
than 600 enterprises and testing the discriminating capacity of the indicators initially 
considered are presented herein. 
Keywords: crisis, insolvency, alert measures, board of statutory auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale), audit irm, crisis setlement body for companies (OCRI from its Italian initials), 
performance measurement, crisis indicators, Italian crisis and insolvency legislation, 
crisis thresholds, European directive on preventive restructuring frameworks and 
insolvency (COM (2016) 723), UNCITRAL
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1. The business crisis as an opportunity for growth
The crisis is a stage in which the company can ind itself during its life cycle. If well managed, 
but above all identiied in time, it can also represent an opportunity for growth. In fact, the 
crisis (from the Greek κρίσις, decision) translates into change, the need for a turnaround and 
represents, at the same time, an event from which to derive a strengthening of the company 
with evolutionary perspectives that would not have occurred, without the manifestation of 
the state of di culties [1].
The crisis-opportunity binomial [2] could appear to be a contradiction; it is normal to think 
that a company experiencing di culties does not have the resources to grow, but it is instead 
fundamental that the crisis be faced also by investing in internal resources and skills, guiding 
them towards the achievement of new balances [3]. A crisis promptly diagnosed and man-
aged with a view to growth will bring with it not only an improvement of the members’ 
skills in the organisation and the introduction of management innovations, but including the 
increase of the cohesion level of the entrepreneurial group and the gaining of experience for 
preventing future crises.
The concept of crisis, for entrepreneurs, is complex to deal with, many of them take an ati-
tude of rejection towards this event and have substantial di culties in admiting the down-
fall, even when they are already involved, at least as long as it does not assume size such as to 
be diagnosed as a real overt crisis.1 Crises, in fact, are preceded by stages of decline [4], which 
if promptly diagnosed and addressed, can stop the degenerative process, and even trigger a 
total reversal process [1]. Situations of decline or crisis may arise from ineiciency, overcapac-
ity or structural rigidity [1] from decay of products, from shortcomings and marketing errors, 
from the inability to programme, from errors in strategy, from a lack of innovation or from 
others [4]. Crises often occur, therefore, not because they are unavoidable, but because com-
panies are unable to perceive the warning signs; they are not able to limit the harmful efects 
and above all to monitor the threats to prevent them [5]. Often the degenerative process is due 
to the inadequacy of entrepreneurial and managerial resources with respect to the complexity 
of the issues to be managed [6].
2. Crisis stages and warnings: the role of actors involved in corporate 
governance and external parties
When a company goes into crisis, imbalances and ineiciencies start to appear, productivity 
and turnover are reduced, with the consequent creation—in the case of an industrial com-
pany—of stock surpluses and, more generally, of an inadequate coverage of inancial needs. 
1Please refer to the following paragraph for the classiication of the various stages of crises, the benchmarking of possible 
interventions consistent with new legislation and the identiication of the role of actors involved in corporate governance 
and external parties.
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This provokes during a period of greater or lesser duration, a contraction of proits or even 
losses with the consequent gradual impoverishment of the available shareholders’ equity. The 
persistence of this situation can lead, if timely measures are not taken, to more signiicant dif-
iculties and to the inability to cope on a regular basis, with the obligations assumed. This can 
be followed by damages to the company’s image and credibility and consequently, the loss 
of customers and a decline in conidence in the inancial system which translates into, in the 
Italian context, primarily as the loss of bank credit facilities.
A number of authors studied the typical timetable of situations that usually occur when a 
company goes into crisis and, if it fails to carry out an efective and prompt turnaround action, 
it becomes insolvent [4, 7, 8]. During each stage, it is possible and relevant that persons in 
charge of the corporate governance—both with a management role as with the role of super-
vision and control—must carry out associate actions as the di culties arise and therefore, 
the management of the crisis stages. In accordance with the European Directive (COM (2016) 
723)—on preventive restructuring frameworks and insolvency—Italy has implemented the 
Directive by introducing the “enabling act” irst and then the “crisis and insolvency code”. 
In the following paragraphs, we try to provide a systemic reading that takes into account the 
indications of the new Italian “crisis and insolvency code” published as a draft in December 
2017. The stated goal of the new regulatory framework is to achieve a beter satisfaction of 
creditors safeguarding the rights of debtors, as well as encouraging the overcoming of the 
crisis by ensuring business continuity.2
2.1. First stage: incubation of the crisis and “informal” internal alert
At the beginning, an incubation stage develops which can be considered normal as can occur to 
any company on structural grounds. It manifests itself with the identiication of management 
or production ineiciencies. Its severity and evolution must be assessed by the administrators 
also with the aid of forecasting tools such as the business plan to assess the progress of manage-
ment and intervene with speciic corrective actions. Corporate supervisory bodies will analyse 
the behaviour of administrative bodies ensuring that an adequate organisational system is imple-
mented with particular reference to the presence, structure and functioning of an adequate system 
of internal control and having a reliable and efective dashboard of indicators that monitors all 
the parameters and thresholds identiied in the new “insolvency crisis code”. Reference is made 
to Section 4 in which more information is provided on the subject of “crisis indicators”. The new 
Italian legislative framework provides that when “serious indications” of a crisis are detected, 
control bodies must immediately notify the board of directors of the appropriate measures.
The current critical situation is absolutely evident and requires the exercise of a high degree of 
professionalism and experience by all the players involved. It is only necessary to observe that 
2It is worth highlighting that the new crisis and insolvency code provides a judicially relevant deinition of the two con-
cepts of “crisis” and “insolvency”. More speciically, the “economic crisis” must be understood as the state of economic 
and inancial di culties that makes a debtor’s insolvency probable and that for companies, it manifests as an inadequacy 
of prospective cash lows to regularly meet planned obligations. On the contrary, a debtor is deined as “insolvent”, when 
it is no longer able to meet its obligations on a regular basis, and this manifests itself as defaults or other external factors.
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at this stage, the intervention of the corporate supervisory bodies must be balanced and must 
take into account the fact that the company is facing di culties, but that these are likely to 
prove reversible. Only an understanding of the features that characterise the situation being 
faced will therefore allow weighing lines of conduct appropriately. Measures that are too 
invasive and disproportionate, due, for example, to errors in classifying the situation that lead 
to anticipating behaviour, and therefore, reports, foreseen for the subsequent stages, could 
themselves constitute causes of a worsening and stifening of the situation, which is clearly 
undesired, risking taking the form of self-fulilling prophecies.
On the other hand, directors must learn to understand the importance of the role of the board 
of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) and new duties, but, it is good to underline, including 
the new powers that the new code has objectively acknowledged, further legitimising their 
work. Especially in smaller companies, it will therefore be necessary for directors—to avoid 
unnecessary conlicts and therefore, risks of repeated reports—to develop, on the one hand, 
a beter ability to listen to the indications of supervisory bodies, and on the other hand, a bet-
ter capacity for reporting which must be systematic, formalised and timely on the measures 
undertaken and their impact.
2.2. Second stage: maturity of the crisis and “formal” internal alert
If a solution is not found, the company may slip into a second stage of maturity of the crisis. The 
ineiciencies that during incubation were not promptly dealt with produce more consistent 
efects and begin to afect company resources. The irst inancial di culties are beginning to be 
encountered, which can result in worsening of the economic results achieved and also in terms 
of assets with a reduction of the available shareholders’ equity, afected by the unsatisfactory 
results of the period. The reading of oicial inancial statements can lead to the irst, probably 
weak, reactions from stakeholders, which, while continuing to have conidence to the com-
pany, can however start to show concern. At this stage, it is even more essential for the inter-
vention of administrative bodies to be decisive and focused as they must assess the severity of 
the most probable evolution of the situation and the efects of the later on business continuity.
In order to make the alert more timely and, in consideration of the importance of banks, espe-
cially in the Italian context, as main lenders, or only lenders to smaller-sized companies, the new 
regulatory framework has introduced direct disclosure obligations between these parties and 
the corporate supervisory bodies. More speciically, banks, when they notify changes or revi-
sions in credit lines to the customer, must also inform the corporate supervisory bodies, if any.
Supervisory bodies, in particular, as we will see beter in next paragraphs, the board of statu-
tory auditors, which constantly monitors a series of corporate performance indicators, are 
called at this stage to assess whether to implement an “internal alert” system. They must 
ensure that directors are aware of the existence of a more identiied and relevant criticality 
than in the previous stage and of the need to undertake a well-identiied path to avoid the 
consolidation of a crisis situation.
To this end, the board of statutory auditors and the other controllers may decide to take 
some further steps, this time more formal. Once the situation has been classiied as signiicant 
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and, of course, in the event of inertia of the directors, that is, only in the case where adequate 
measures have not already been implemented by the directors as a result of less invasive 
interactions with the supervisory bodies themselves, they may decide to implement a speciic 
“reporting procedure”. The later consists of sending, with reason for its own decision, an oi-
cial writen notice—therefore, with proof of receipt—to the directors with whom an appropri-
ate, but short time limit not exceeding 1 month is set—within which the board of directors 
must report on the solutions identiied and the initiatives undertaken.
The risk that, in the absence of timely intervention, the thresholds that may lead to automatic 
reporting by qualiied public creditors, beter described later, may be excessed must be duly 
taken into consideration by both the directors and the control bodies.
2.3. Third stage: reversible full crisis, internal alert “to external entities” and 
external alert
If the intervention described in the previous stage does not occur in a timely manner or if it 
does not produce a positive outcome, the company may however enter a full-blown crisis stage. 
The later is characterised by the emergence of more signiicant inancial imbalances that, once 
again, if not actively managed, can seriously compromise business continuity. We arrive at the 
“crisis” in a judicial sense, or in other words, as mentioned earlier, to the “inadequacy of future 
cash lows to meet regularly planned obligations”. During this stage, the relationship with the 
lenders to the business activity becomes fundamental. In respect to the later, they must be 
provided with the opportunity of having access to detailed and prospective information in 
order to allow them to assess the company’s situation and a shared and rational strategy must 
be agreed upon with them. The risk of losing the trust of corporate stakeholders is, however, 
more general during this stage and not limited to this category. Even customers, suppliers and 
employees, to cite the main stakeholders, need to have access to the same information; other-
wise, the company can lose fundamental resources for its own survival [9, 10]. The company 
and, therefore, the directors must demonstrate in a transparent and convincing manner the 
existence of strength elements—of an industrial or commercial type—and/or that extraordinary 
interventions have been planned—such as internal reorganisation, cost restructuring, strategic 
repositioning, partnership with new entities, recapitalisation by the shareholders themselves 
or by third parties—such as to make it possible to classify imbalances identiied as temporary.
The corporate supervisory bodies monitor the correct seting up of a dialogue process with the 
parties that are strategically relevant for company’s survival. They must also assess whether 
the company can still emerge from the crisis independently, under the guidance of solely the 
directors or if, in order to secure the company’s business, it is necessary to trigger an “internal 
alert to external entities” process. With this regard, the new legislative framework provides 
that, in the event that planned interventions, including possibly following the irst informal 
and then formal “internal alert” referred to in the previous stages, are considered inadequate 
or in the event of inertia, that is, failure to take suicient measures, the corporate supervi-
sory bodies must report the situation identiied to a speciic third party called OCRI (from its 
Italian initials, “Organismo di composizione della crisi di impresa”) or crisis setlement body for 
companies. It is necessary to highlight that: (1) on the one hand, the timely reporting to the 
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body responsible for the setlement of the crisis constitutes a cause for exemption from joint 
and several liability for the corporate supervisory bodies due to the detrimental consequences 
of the omissions or actions subsequently implemented by the board of directors in contrast to 
the requirements received, which are not a direct consequence of decisions taken before the 
report; (2) on the other hand, and in the same way, reward measures are foreseen for entre-
preneurs who provide a timely remedy to the crisis situation.
As already mentioned, the new code also identiies a speciic category of parties considered 
to be particularly relevant for the timely emergence of the crisis which are deined as “quali-
ied public creditors” and which are given very signiicant powers in the alert process. The 
parties are IRS (Agenzia delle Entrate), the national insurance institution and the tax collection 
agent. They are given the power to send an additional alert to the “crisis setlement body for 
companies” (OCRI). This alert is a “totally external alert” or, beter, an “external alert to exter-
nal entities” as it is brought forth by a third party with “opposing interests” with respect to 
the company and is addressed to another external entity. The envisaged procedure is totally 
objectiied as it operates in accordance with speciic automatisms, based on overcoming the 
identiied thresholds of doubtful debts,3 it is necessary to understand that it could therefore 
already be triggered even in previous stages. The above-mentioned is a modality of introduc-
ing the alert which is completely independent and concurrent with respect to that entrusted to 
the corporate supervisory bodies: an exchange of direct and preliminary information between 
the two parties does not seem in fact to be coordinated nor explicitly required. External alert-
ing requested by institutions can be divided from a timing standpoint into two phases. First 
of all, they are required to give immediate notice to the debtor—and therefore, directly to the 
directors and not to the corporate supervisory bodies—of the fact that the debt exposure has 
exceeded the critical threshold identiied by the legislation as relevant.4 Then, they must wait 
the short term of 3 months to allow the debtor to resolve the situation subject to notiication 
by one of the following actions: (1) the extinction per se of his/her/its debt; (2) or reaching an 
agreement with the reporting body; (3) or again, the company’s submission of application 
for setlement assisted by the crisis or the application for access to an agreed procedure for 
resolving the crisis. In the event of the directors’ inactivity, at the end of the 3 months, they are 
again required within the short term of 30 days to: on the one hand, send a speciic report to 
the supervisory bodies of the company, and on the other hand, contextually, to send a speciic 
report directly to the crisis setlement body for companies.
3The debt exposure is considered to be of a signiicant amount: (1) for the revenue agency, when the total amount of 
debt expired for value added tax is equal to at least half of the total value added tax due for the previous year and is in 
any case higher than 100,000 Euro; (2) for national insurance, when the debtor is overdue by more than 6 months in the 
payment of national insurance contributions of an amount greater than half of those due in the previous year, and in any 
case, higher than the threshold of 10,000 Euro; (3) for the tax collection agency, when the sum of the receivables assigned 
for collection by the debtor exceeds the amount of 5% of the volume of business resulting from the taxpayer’s last tax 
return, provided it exceeds the threshold of 30,000 Euro, or in any case, when it exceeds the amount of 5000 Euro; in the 
case of exclusively value added tax debts, the reference threshold is that indicated in t and (4) If the debtor documents 
that it is the holder of tax credits or other receivables from public administrations for which 90 days have elapsed since 
the formal notice, for a total amount that, brought in correspondence with the debts, determines the failure to exceed the 
thresholds identiied by the legislator. In this case, qualiied public creditors shall refrain from reporting.
4The notice to the debtor must be made by certiied electronic mail or, in the absence, by registered mail with acknowl-
edgement of receipt which must be sent by the revenue agency together with the reporting of irregularities. The national 
insurance institution and the tax collection agent must notify the notice within 30 days of the threshold being exceeded.
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The notice from “qualiied public creditors” to “corporate supervisory bodies”, envisaged 
only subsequently—after the terms granted—and not at the beginning of the process, seems 
to conirm that already noted, namely the fact that the two alerts are concurrent. It is quite 
clear indeed that when the irst parties turn their atention to the later to inform them, they 
are not carrying out an action aimed at inding a shared solution, but in fact, they notify one-
sidedly what is now considered a concrete state of afairs that one can only note. It seems 
that this notice has more than anything else the function of providing a certain date at the 
time when the irst of the alerts was also triggered for the purpose of applying exemptions 
and incentives to the corporate supervisory bodies on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
penalties from the institutions. It must be noted that while corporate supervisory bodies are 
expected to provide incentive mechanisms for emerging from a state of crisis, in the case of 
“qualiied public creditors”, the new legislative framework provides for penalties in the event 
of inertia of the institution and therefore, potential delays in reporting. In particular, for the 
IRS (Agenzia delle Entrate) and the national insurance institution, it is envisaged that the right 
of pre-emption will have no efect on the receivables held by them, while for the tax collec-
tion agent, the unenforceability of the receivable is envisaged for collection costs and charges.
The efects of the operation of the OCRI or of the crisis setlement body for companies are 
immediate. It is expected that the body appoints a board of three independent professionals 
(henceforth also known as the Triad), bound—among other things—by the obligation of con-
identiality on all information acquired during the performance of their duties and who must 
keep secret facts and documents of which they may become aware in connection with their 
oice.5 The Triad promptly convenes the directors to identify with them the possible mea-
sures to be taken to remedy the crisis and sets a deadline by which the directors must report 
with regard to their implementation. If the company proves to have identiied a speciic route 
and to have undertaken initiatives deemed useful to follow it, a deadline of not more than 
3 months is set, which can be extended up to a maximum of 6 months in the event of positive 
results of the negotiations, in order to search for an agreed solution to the crisis. In most cases, 
the route proposed by the company must be out of court based on substantial agreements 
undersigned with the creditors and iled with the body, and they cannot be shown to parties 
other than those who have signed them. These agreements assume signiicant legal value as 
they are not subject to the revocation action exactly as would happen in the event of imple-
menting a recovery and resolution planning (“piano atestato” pursuant to art. 67 of the bank-
ruptcy law—see below). The new code does not exclude the direct recourse to procedures for 
regulating the crisis—characterising the next stage—see below—without a prior atempt to 
setle out of court, also providing in these cases for the possibility of a more invasive interven-
tion by the Triad.
5Once the report has been received, the contact person of the Body appoints without delay a panel of three experts from 
those registered in the register of crisis and insolvency managers, of which: (1) one is appointed by the chairman of the 
specialised section with regard to insolvency proceedings by the court in the place where the company’s registered oice 
is located or by a representative of the company; (2) one is appointed by the president of the chamber of commerce, 
industry, crafts and agriculture or by his/her representative, and must be diferent from that appointed by the contact 
person and (3) one is appointed by the local representatives of the business associations of each category, each of which 
forwards to the body, a list containing a number of experts registered in the aforementioned register, among which the 
contact person identiies the one appointed by the representative association of the sector to which the debtor belongs.
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2.4. Fourth stage: reversible insolvency and use of crisis and insolvency procedures
In the event of the failure of out-of-court negotiations, assisted or not by the Triad appointed 
by the OCRI, the company structurally enters into a stage classiied as reversible insolvency. 
The new code recognises “insolvency” as the status of a debtor who is no longer able to 
meet its obligations on a regular basis. During this stage, this situation is known and mani-
fests itself in the company, both outside of third parties for the failures incurred and for 
atempts—which have been proved unsuccessful—to reach individual or collective free 
agreements with creditors. In the event that the external alert has already been triggered 
in the previous stage, and by the assigned or extended deadline, it has not been possible to 
reach an out-of-court agreement with the creditors involved, the Triad requests the debtor 
to apply for access to a procedure for regulating the crisis or insolvency within a very short 
time (maximum 30 days).
In the irst instance, the directors must verify that the situation is still reversible, that there 
are speciic possibilities for carrying out a turnaround in direct or indirect continuity or the 
implementation of a liquidation intervention plan beneicial to creditors. The tools provided 
for this from the new crisis and insolvency code6 are, in substance, even if subject to some 
signiicant changes, those already introduced in 2005 in Italian legislation following less inva-
sive reforms, but that undoubtedly have had a signiicant cultural and behavioural impact7 
[11–16].
To counter the di culties of the crisis, the Italian government has indeed already introduced 
during the last decade some speciic instruments: (1) recovery and resolution planning (“piano 
atestato” pursuant to art. 67 of the bankruptcy law); (2) restructuring agreement (“accordo 
di ristruturazione” pursuant to art. 182 bis of the bankruptcy law) and (3) PAC-preventive 
arrangement with creditors (“concordato preventivo” pursuant to art. 160 of the bankruptcy 
law).
In the PACs, the proposal extends along one of the following alternatives [15, 16]: (1) restruc-
turing of debts and satisfaction of credits through any form, including the sale of assets and 
the allocation of shares or other inancial instruments (“concordato liquidatorio”); (2) ongoing 
business managed by the debtor (“continuità direta”); (3) business or part of the ongoing 
business transferring the property thereof to one or more diferent companies (“continuità 
indireta”). In the irst case—liquidation agreement—the debtor must “ensure” payment of 
secured creditors and a minimum payment of at least 20% of the corresponding original unse-
cured debt. More than this, the debtor must provide new funds to be able to add at least a 10% 
to the sums allocated to unsecured creditors.
These techniques form a continuum based on the degree of judicial intervention and the 
degree of formality in general [21]. Ideas to shape them come from the US Chapter 11 
6Procedures for setling the over-indebtedness crisis which essentially concerns consumers, professionals and minor 
entrepreneurs are here ignored.
7The reform of Italian Bankruptcy and Business Recovery Law was introduced in 2005 and then reviewed more than 
once [11, 17–19]. It has fundamentally changed the philosophy and the basics of the country’s business recovery proce-
dures. The new regulations has been introduced to the maintenance and recovery of the company by estimation of agree-
ments between creditors and entrepreneur, with a greater involvement of the former in management of the crisis [12, 20].
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tradition [22–25] and from United Nations Commission on International Trade Laws [26], 
Legislative Guide to the Insolvency Law. The focal point is that restructuring can help to 
preserve the business value of debtor enterprises, the interests of other stakeholders and 
the beneit of creditors as a whole [4]. According to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
(2005)1, all debtors that falter or experience serious inancial diiculties in a competitive 
marketplace should not necessarily be liquidated; a debtor with a reasonable survival 
prospect (such as one with a potentially proitable business) should be given the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that there is a greater value (and, by deduction, greater beneit for 
creditors in the long term) in maintaining the essential business and other component 
parts of the debtor. Restructuring and reorganisation proceedings are designed to give 
to the debtor some breathing space to recover from its temporary liquidity diiculties or 
more permanent over-indebtedness and, as necessary, provides the debtor with an oppor-
tunity to restructure its debt and its relations with creditors. If reorganisation is possible, 
generally, it will be preferred by creditors if the value derived from the continued opera-
tion of the debtor’s business will enhance the value of its claims [11, 12].
The success of any restructuring technique is related to the quality of operations that the 
company has planned to implement. This is the reason why, no mater which of the three 
instruments the company chooses, the law requires that more than one independent expert 
should analyse the potentially prospective inancial data produced by the recovery strategy. 
Diferent speciic opinions are required about the feasibility of the project and the fairness of 
the expected igures. In recovery and resolution planning and in restructuring agreement, 
they are expressed by an independent expert indicated by the company, while in PACs, a 
second opinion is needed from the Trustee indicated by the Court.
In addition, the situation is continuously monitored by the Board of Statutory Auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale) [27]. In fact, at this stage, the corporate supervisory bodies—after contributing to the 
alert process that led to structuring the solution chosen by the company—continue to perform 
their supervisory and auditing activities. To this end, they monitor, in compliance with the docu-
ments issued by the Italian Board of Certiied Public Accountants (Rules of Conduct of the Board 
of Statutory Auditors, December 2015), the conduct of the directors, the economic and inancial 
performance and the company’s inancial statements, assessing, in carrying out their periodic 
checks, the sustainability of the choices made and the methods for actually implementing the 
later. The results of this activity are noted in their minutes and reports.
2.5. Fifth stage: full insolvency and application for judicial liquidation
If directors do not consider the possibility of applying one of the procedures for regulating 
the crisis and insolvency or the later have not had the desired outcome, the company inds 
itself in the inal stage of the process called overt insolvency. The situation is now irreversible, 
inancial reconstruction goals are no longer usefully pursued, nor are there suicient fresh 
inancial resources available to implement an agreed setlement. In fact, it is only necessary to 
remember that the new code provides for the possibility of seting up a setlement agreement 
only if there is an insuicient contribution to increase the satisfaction of unsecured creditors 
by at least 10%. The only viable way therefore, remains that which the new code calls “judicial 
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liquidation”, with this expression meaning the procedure currently known as “bankruptcy”.8 
It is important to highlight that among the persons entitled to ile a petition for the opening 
of the proceedings, the code envisaged alongside the debtor himself, creditors, the public 
prosecutor and the corporate supervisory bodies and therefore, irst of all, the board of statu-
tory auditors.
2.6. Summary table
Table 1 provides a summary that highlights planned initiatives and who is actively involved 
in the various stages of the crisis, distinguishing between bodies that operate in the corporate 
governance sphere with management roles or supervisory roles and external entities.
2.7. A short comparison with the French “Alerte”
The Italian system to detect business crisis can be compared with the French “Alerte”. The 
Italian law actually was inspired by this prior model.
Two roles are similar. As soon as the entrepreneur understands that sooner or later the com-
pany will get into a crisis, he can undertake a preventive and objective diagnostic process. This 
helps him to identify the causes of the situation and to be able to remove them as quickly as 
possible. The entrepreneur evaluates the severity degree of his di culties so that the “Alerte” 
process helps him to properly manage the situation. If the entrepreneur is not able to do the 
job by himself, auditors are asked to notify the alert as soon as they identify facts that could 
compromise the continuity of the business. If the entrepreneur, once informed, does not give 
a satisfactory answer or even when the decisions taken by the “assemblée générale” do not 
guarantee the business continuity, auditors can ask to be heard by Court President.
Some other roles are diferent. On the one hand, as already pointed out, the Italian new code 
identiies a speciic category of parties considered to be particularly relevant for the timely 
detection of the crisis which are deined as “qualiied public creditors” and which are given 
very signiicant powers in the alert process. The parties are IRS (Agenzia delle Entrate), the 
national insurance institution and the tax collection agent as already explained. On the other 
hand, in France: (1) a speciic power is given to employees through the “comité d’entreprise”. 
When they get aware of the facts that may afect the company’s economic situation, they 
can request explanation to the employer. If the answer conirms the situation detected, they 
may decide to send a report to the entrepreneur and to the auditors and (2) then, sharehold-
ers informed of events that may compromise the business continuity, can notify the facts 
to management through a writen question. The answer must also be communicated to the 
auditors who can notify it to the Court President if they consider it useful and (3) at last, the 
8The desire to impose a change of name is not only a lexical whim, but brings with it the desire to eliminate the very 
negative connotation unquestionably linked—in the Italian context—to the concept of “failure” and consequently of 
“loser” when addressed to individuals. This decision was probably also inluenced by the detection during the years of 
crisis of an important increase in the number of suicides among Italian entrepreneurs. According to the Link Lab Social 
Research Laboratory of Link Campus University, “suicides due to inancial reasons” were over 800 from 2012 to date. 
From the above-mentioned, about 43% are entrepreneurs, of which more than 30% are in the North-East alone. htp://
linklab.unilink.it/suicidi-motivazioni-economiche-dati-1-semestre-2017
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most remarkable role, in France context, is the one reserved directly for the Court President. 
When he has knowledge of the di culties of a company, he shall convene the entrepreneur 
to an interview, so that this last is provided with measures to correct his situation. He may, 
Stage Business 
situation
Planned 
initiative
Parties involved
Within Corporate Governance 
(with management or supervisory 
roles)
External parties
1 Incubation 
of the crisis
Informal internal 
alert
• Directors
• Corporate supervisory bodies: 
Board of statutory auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), Audit Firm
---
2 Maturity of 
the crisis
Formal internal 
alert
• Directors
• Corporate supervisory bodies: 
Board of statutory auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), Audit irm
• Legal advisor, Financial 
advisor
• Credit institutions, Banks
• Independent expert, I.E. (Atestatore)
• Possibly: Court, Judicial 
Commissioner J.C. in the event of 
a PAC
3 Reversible 
overt crisis
Internal alert to 
external entities 
(corporate 
supervisory 
bodies).
External alert to 
external entities 
(qualiied public 
creditors)
• Directors
• Corporate supervisory bodies: 
Board of statutory auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), Audit irm
• Legal advisor, Financial 
advisor
• Qualiied public creditors
• Crisis setlement body for compa-
nies (OCRI)
• Triad of independent professionals 
appointed by the OCRI
• Independent expert, I.E. (Atestatore)
• Possibly: Court, Judicial 
Commissioner J.C. in the event of 
a PAC
4 Reversible 
insolvency
Crisis and 
insolvency 
regulation 
procedures
• Directors
• Corporate supervisory bodies: 
Board of statutory auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), Audit irm
• Legal advisor and Financial 
advisor
• Crisis setlement body for compa-
nies (OCRI)
• Triad of independent professionals 
appointed by the OCRI
• Independent expert, I.E. (Atestatore)
• Court
• Judicial Commissioner J.C. in the 
event of a PAC
5 Full 
insolvency
Judicial 
liquidation
• Directors
• Corporate supervisory bodies: 
Board of statutory auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), Audit irm
• Administrative authorities 
that exercise supervision and 
control over the company
• Creditors
• Public prosecutor
• Court
• Trustee
Table 1. Parties involved in the crisis governance and actions needed during the various stages.
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if necessary, obtain from the auditors, the administrations, the social organisations and the 
“Banque de France”, information on the situation of the company.
3. A change from the revolutionary scope: the extension of the range 
of corporate bodies obliged to legal forms of control as a condition 
for the success of the alert procedure
The real revolutionary scope of the new code is, in the authors’ opinion, the enhancement 
of the corporate supervisory function with the extension of the range of corporate bodies 
obliged to legal forms of control. The appointment of the corporate supervisory body—board 
of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) or maybe single statutory auditor—becomes manda-
tory if the company has exceeded for at least two consecutive years; one of the following9: (1) total 
assets in the inancial statements: 2 million Euro (equal to less than 50% of the previous limit 
of 4.4 million Euro); (2) revenues from sales and services: 2 million Euro (equal to less than 
25% of the previous limit of 8.8 million Euro); (3) employees employed on average during 
the inancial year: 10 employees (equal to 20% of the previous limit of 50 employees). The 
obligation to appoint the control body or auditor ceases when, for three consecutive inancial 
years, none of the aforementioned limits have been exceeded. Size of the company becomes 
crucial for the appointment of the Board of statutory auditors. The lowering of the threshold 
beyond which is required to appoint the Board of statutory auditors is expected to carry posi-
tive efect.
The scale of this cultural change is indeed likely to be much greater and more invasive than 
the introduction of OCRI itself, as well as the identiication of automatic crisis detection mech-
anisms for qualiied public creditors.
The introduction of these new thresholds represents a very important recognition of the useful-
ness of corporate supervisory functions for the correct functioning of the system, when carried 
out according to the ethical and professional standards of reference [28]. The Board of statu-
tory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) is the speciic watchdog distinguishing the Italian corporate 
 governance traditional system10 [12]. The abovementioned change intends to modify the behav-
iour of directors of medium-sized companies, but especially of small- and micro-sized compa-
nies that are very numerous in Italy11 and today have escaped the obligation to equip themselves 
with appropriate control systems, or even with appropriate accounting and management sys-
tems. Infrequently, in these small businesses, the administrative functions are still perceived 
as an obligation related only to tax obligations and are delegated in full by outsourcing, losing 
9Furthermore, companies required to draft consolidated inancial statements and who control a company obliged to 
audit the accounts are required to appoint the board of statutory auditors.
10With the enactment of the Commercial Code in 1882, it was introduced a supervisory organ for the compliance control 
to the law, to the Constitution and to the Statute of the company because after the abolition of Government Supervision, 
it was necessary to entrust the fate of a company not entirely to administrators, whose activity in reality should be con-
trolled to protect the interests of the company, its shareholders and all the stakeholders.
11For a breakdown of the company situation and in particular, the composition of the type of businesses afected by the 
crisis in the last period, please refer to paragraph 5 where the empirical analysis is presented.
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sight of the scope and relevance of tools such as the drawing up of frequent periodic inan-
cial statements and of business units and dashboards of signiicant indicators for management 
control and speciically for corporate governance. One only needs, in fact, to recall the Rule of 
Conduct 1.1 issued by the Italian National Council of Chartered Accountants and Accounting 
Experts (CNDCEC) [29] for the Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale), which establishes 
that the later, in carrying out the function recognised by the law, supervises that the control 
system and the organisational structures adopted by the company are adequate to promptly 
detect signals that raise signiicant doubts about the company’s ability to continue operating as 
an operating entity. The Board can request clariications from the board of directors and request 
the later to take appropriate measures.
Size is relevant because the smaller it is: (1) the less structured usually appears to be the gen-
eral accounting systems; (2) the less implemented typically result in management systems 
and consequently, the capabilities to produce both short-term and long-term projections and 
forecast; (3) the weaker are expected to turn out to be internal auditors’ procedures. In this 
context, reducing the threshold beyond which it is required to appoint the Board of statutory 
auditors introduces some useful and healthy routines.
In fact, among the functions of the Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale), the protec-
tion of all the interests must be emphasised. The administration and control system called 
“Traditional”, as an alternative to the one-tier and two-tier corporate governance model, 
is the prevalent one in the Italian context. According to article 2380 of the Civil Code, the 
“Traditional” model constitutes the natural system of corporate governance for the manage-
ment of Italian irms, the application of the two alternative models must be indeed expressly 
provided in a special provision of the company’s statute. The structure of this model provides 
an administrative board appointed by shareholders, which is responsible for the management 
of the company, the Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) again appointed by share-
holders that carries out the control over the administration and the external audit irm also 
appointed by shareholders, which is responsible for the auditing. This model allows a precise 
division of roles: the administrative function is clearly separated from the control function. 
The Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) appointed by shareholders is made up 
of three or ive efective members (and two temporary auditors). One efective member and 
one substitute should be enrolled in the register of auditors. Since the introduction of the 
Reform of Company (Legislative Decree N. 6, January 17, 2003), the Board of statutory audi-
tors (Collegio Sindacale) is responsible to supervise12: (1) the observance of the law and the stat-
ute, it should verify the compliance of acts and resolutions to the provisions of both law and 
statute; (2) the conformity of the management decisions to criteria of rationality (eiciency 
and efectiveness of choices) and if management has considered all the information necessary 
for taking operational decisions and (3) the adequacies of the organisational structure that 
must be suitable to the size, to the nature of the operations and to the strategies planned to 
achieve corporate purposes.
12According to Art. 2403 Civil Code, “The Supervisory Board oversees compliance to the law, to the company’s Statute to 
the principles of good management and the adequacy of the organisational, administrative and accounting procedures 
adopted by the company during its functioning”.
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There is no doubt that the Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) represents an impor-
tant element of the Italian experience that should be emphasised in international contexts. 
The great crisis that has hit the world economy since 2008 could have been avoided if more 
companies would have adopted an adequate internal control system to ensure the protection 
of the social interest performing their duties. Even Joseph Stigliz—who won Nobel Prize for 
economics, 2001—highlighted the criticality and riskiness of governance models based only 
on external auditor (typical of Anglo-Saxon models) praising the Italian model based on the 
structural presence of a typical totally independent internal control body, that is, the Board 
of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale) [27]. The members of the later atend the assembly 
of the Board of Directors assisting directly to the decision-making processes and stepping in 
meanwhile things happen. On the contrary, external auditors operate when everything has 
already been decided or even implemented. The peculiarity of the Italian System Controls is 
the joint existence of two levels of controls. A “downstream” control carried out by auditors 
in charge of the accounting control and an “upstream” control carried out by the Supervisory 
Board in charge for the surveillance of management’s behaviour. In small companies, the 
Supervisory Board usually undertakes both roles. With the new code, this will become the 
most widespread instance.
4. Dashboard of indicators and thresholds that trigger alerts: 
“Deterministic” approach and business economic approach
The extent of the changes introduced has made it essential to identify parameters that allow 
to understand as objectively as possible if the company is entering the crisis and what is the 
severity already reached by it in order to classify the situation. Only in this way, it is indeed 
possible not to delay (although it is important to underline that they must not be anticipated), 
the interventions envisaged by the new regulatory framework by the various stakeholders 
involved. This is a crucial issue which, if not duly addressed in corporate economic terms, 
risks not only to render the new mechanism for emerging from the crisis inefective but also 
makes it very risky to issue alerts in advance. In fact, there are many elements that must be 
considered in order to form an opinion on a company’s situation. Many authors [26, 27] have 
long indicated that it is not correct to base its evaluations on the exclusive reading of some 
speciic indices, but that it is essential to adopt a systemic approach, certainly more complex, 
less eicient and less objective, but more efective and with substantial and not only formal 
discriminative capacity.
We here describe the changes made in the legislative texts currently made available that bear 
witness to the current debate and the important and positive interventions occurring during 
the course of the work, to then propose empirical research aimed at highlighting the degree 
of efectiveness of the various solutions.
The issue was in fact addressed irst of all in the Government Enabling Act approved on 11 
October, 2017 which identiied more than a systemic dashboard of economic-inancial and 
equity indicators, literally “four” inancial indicators that the corporate supervisory bodies 
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must take into consideration and assess in order to classify the company situation and conse-
quently, to decide on which actions to take. These are the following parameters: (1) debt ratio; 
(2) credit rotation index; (3) inventory turnover index and (4) liquidity index. It is worth point-
ing out that in companies without a warehouse, the parameters identiied are reduced to three.
The draft of the crisis and insolvency code, which has been followed up by the Enabling Act in 
order to implement the later, no single indicators are recalled, but, taking in substantial terms 
the indications provided in the Enabling Act, it is less deterministic. It refers to a dashboard of 
indexes which need to be designed taking into consideration the speciic characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial activity carried out by the debtor. Focus is on the sustainability of debts in the 
following 6 months and prospects of business continuity, as well as the existence of signiicant 
and repeated delays in making payments. The code then makes an explicit and strong refer-
ence to speciic standards on the mater that will be issued by the professional category of refer-
ence, in other words, the Italian National Council of Chartered Accountants and Accounting 
Experts (CNDCEC). The later is in fact indicated as the only entity required to draw up, on a 
3-year basis, those indices which, assessed as a complete dashboard, reasonably assume the 
existence of a state of crisis in the company. It is important to highlight that the Code speciies 
that the choice of the indicators must not be formulated in a general way for all companies, 
but that speciic indicators must be considered for each type of economic activity according to 
the National Statistical Institute (Istat) classiications. In formulating the reference documents, 
the Board is invited to consider national and international best practices.
The draft Code, however, continues to identify, along with the indices developed by the 
CNDCEC, some parameters and some thresholds of the values assumed by the later, which 
give rise in certain situations to unique elements to be considered for the automatic occur-
rence of some efects. These are the parameters that are deliberately measurable in an “objec-
tive” way and this of course implies that readings of the later are not acceptable in the context 
of a more systemic view of the business situation.
The “deterministic” approach remains in two cases: irstly, to qualify the debtor’s initiative as 
to promptly trigger the alert and, therefore, to assess the applicability of reward measures for 
the debtor company and of the liability for the Board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale). 
In fact, requests for access to one of the insolvency procedures after the 6-month deadline, 
or the request to the OCRI following the end of 3 months, to be counted from the moment 
of verifying the occurrence of the following, are considered timely: (1) the existence of debts 
for wages and salaries expired for at least 60 days for an amount equal to more than half of 
the total salary; (2) the existence of payables to suppliers expired for at least 120 days for an 
amount higher than that of unexpired debts. Secondly, as already described above, determine 
the moment in which qualiied public creditors must serve their own notiications irst to the 
debtor and therefore, in the event that no solution is found, to the OCRI and at the same time 
as the Board of statutory auditors.
The method based on a dashboard of indicators is only one of the diferent approaches. 
Inductive approach is the simplest method—based on non-inancial indicators—to detect 
business crisis. This last—that uses external indicators such as an extraordinary staf turnover 
or the loss in market share—normally used by small and unstructured companies— requires 
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not only the ability of the entrepreneur to detect the business crisis but also the courage 
of the entrepreneur to bring out his situation. More challenging is the use of multivariate 
approaches— such as the linear discriminant analysis—which constitutes the benchmark for 
our empirical research above described (see Section 5)—or the logistic models. The aim of 
these approaches is to detect business crisis through the use of statistical methods to encapsu-
late all diferent inancial indicators.
5. Veriication of the efectiveness of the inancial statement indices 
required by the enabling act: an empirical analysis
It has been proposed to verify whether the four inancial indicators indicated explicitly, as 
mentioned earlier, in the Enabling Act (Ddl 3671bis) can be considered alone suicient to form 
a reasonably acceptable opinion on the existence and severity of the crisis. It must be noted 
that this refers to the debt ratio, the credit rotation index, the inventory turnover index and 
the liquidity index. The tested research assumption can therefore be summarised as follows: 
the use of only the four indicators identiied in the Enabling Act is suicient to correctly and reasonably 
diferentiate the situations in which it is necessary to trigger the alert procedure.
The analysis was conducted on a sample of 677 companies that requested access to the PAC 
before the Court of Milan during the years 2008–2014 (out of a total population of 1299 com-
panies, with a coverage of 52%). Financial statements for the three inancial years preceding 
the application were analysed. The sample was almost entirely composed of 98% capital com-
panies, of which 61% were limited liability companies and 22% public limited companies. 
The analysis of the distribution of the companies in the sample shows that 47% belong to 
the secondary sector and 51% to the tertiary sector. With reference to the size, adopting the 
deinition of the European Commission (Recommendation No. 2003/361/EC), the sample was 
distributed in four macro-classes based on the number of employees of the year preceding 
the presentation of the application for a setlement with creditors. The companies are mostly 
micro and small, or in other words, with a number of employees less than 50 (Figure 1).
The analysis is carried out considering the values assumed by the indicators provided for by the 
Enabling Act (henceforth also “Indices of 3671bis”) and seting a comparison between the results 
Figure 1. Size of companies.
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achieved and those that would be obtained by applying the diferent model of the Altman 
Z’-score (Altman 1993) proposing a more systemic approach to the issue of corporate perfor-
mance assessment. More speciically, Z’-score best suited to the Italian entrepreneurial network 
is used [28–30]. This expression of the well-known model is based on the use of a function that 
identiies the health status of each company (y), whose dependent variables (x) are represented 
by ive inancial statement indices. The indices in question are as follows: working capital/total 
assets (x
1
); net proit/total assets (x
2
); EBIT/total assets (x
3
); book value of equity/book value of 
total debt (x
4
); sales/total assets (x
5
). The model is therefore composed as follows:
  Z ′ score =  ( x 1 ∙ 0.717) +  ( x 2 ∙ 0.847) +  ( x 3 ∙ 3.107) +  ( x 4 ∙ 0.420) +  ( x 5 ∙ 0.998) (1)
Based on the value assumed by the dependent variable Z', three diferent “zones” are identiied:
• safe zone: for results greater than 2.90; it includes those companies for which the probabil-
ity of default is low;
• grey areas: for results between 1.23 and 2.90; it includes those companies for which the 
probability of insolvency is possible. It is a situation of uncertainty;
• distress zones: for results lower than 1.23; it includes companies for which the probability 
of default is high.
For each company in the sample, the “Indices Ddl3671bis” have been calculated on the inan-
cial statements for the 3 years preceding the application, verifying when they assumed values 
that are reasonably acceptable (positive) and when, on the contrary, they assumed signii-
cant values of the existence of a (negative) corporate crisis. Each of the four variables was 
therefore made measurable and classiiable in a dichotomous manner, identifying, in essence, 
reasonable thresholds of alert for each of the indices. To this end, signiicant values of high 
indebtedness, slow credit rotation, a slow turnover of the warehouse and a strong inancial 
imbalance qualiied as negative. This analysis allowed to identify a ive-point measurement 
scale depending on the values assumed by the indices and the companies reclassiied in the 
three typical index-zones of the analyses that can be obtained with the Z-score in order to 
make the results comparable:
• safe zone: companies in which there are no negative indices (zero negative) or that have 
only one (negative) index are included in this zone;
• grey zones: companies in this zone have recorded two negative indices;
• distress zone: companies which have recorded three or four negative indices are included 
in this zone.
The percentage of companies that fall into the grey area is very high, in fact these are percent-
ages that vary from 60% of the year (x−1) to 49% of the year (x−3) which atest to the fact that in 
essence at least in half of the cases the indices are not able to provide unambiguous indications 
deemed useful to be able to diferentiate between the various situations in an objective way.
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The Z score was then calculated with reference to the same sample of companies and there-
fore on the inancial statements themselves. The results seem to be much more signiicant. By 
analysing the zone in which the results can be found, it is noted that the percentage of compa-
nies that are included in the distress zone on geting closer to the year in which an application 
for a setlement with creditors has been submited (65, 74, 87%); the opposite trend is assumed 
by the grey areas (31, 23, 11%) and the safe zone (4, 3, 3%) for which the percentage of compa-
nies included in them correctly decreases on approaching the year in which an application for 
a setlement with creditors was submited.
Table 2 summarises the results obtained.
For purposes of the early emergence from the crisis, the positioning in the grey zone is the 
most critical since it does not allow to classify the situation with reasonable certainty. The 
percentage of companies located in the safe zone and in the grey zone is much lower if we 
consider the Z-score instead of Indices of Law Decree 3671bis, while the opposite trend is 
recorded with reference to the distress zone.
A weakness of the “Indices of Ddl 3671bis” is undoubtedly represented by the inclusion of 
the inventory rotation index. It is not always possible to apply the above indicator, in addi-
tion, diferent types of activities involve diferent warehouses and consequently turnaround 
days. The indicator can therefore be of complex interpretation if it is not inserted into part of a 
system with other data and other variables. Companies, for example, of the sample carry out, 
as mentioned earlier, very diferent activities from one another, from food to manufacturing, 
from metallurgy to building and services. The food sector needs a faster turnaround of the 
warehouse compared to the metallurgical sector due to the nature of processed products; it is 
not possible to generalise. To sum up, the main features of companies that can be considered 
to have an impact on the indicator signiicance are the speciic sector and the size of the com-
panies. Each sector has its own particular feature: size, maturity, number and size of competi-
tors, level of technology and speed of innovation.
The non-systemic analysis of the four indicators proposed by the Enabling Act is therefore not 
suicient to express a correct opinion on the existence of the business crisis. In more than half 
of the cases, in fact, it does not allow correctly and reasonably to diferentiate the situations in 
which it is necessary to trigger the alert procedure.
Therefore, the choice of the new “Crisis and insolvency code” to broaden the spectrum of indi-
cators to be considered referring to company economic practice and therefore to standards to 
Safe zone (%) Grey zone (%) Distress zone (%)
Ddl 3671bis Z’ score ∆ Ddl 3671bis Z’ score ∆ Ddl 3671bis Z’ score ∆
X-1 16 3 13 60 11 50 24 87 −63
X-2 28 3 25 53 23 29 19 74 −54
X-3 36 4 32 49 31 18 15 65 −50
Table 2. Comparison of the results of the Enabling Act and of the Z-score.
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be issued by the Italian National Council of Chartered Accountants and Accounting Experts 
(CNDCEC) is noteworthy in order to identify dashboards of signiicant and diferentiated 
indices by sector as well as the indication that the later need to be reviewed and updated 
every 3 years to take into account the changes occurred during the period, with particular 
reference to evidence of technical and scientiic evolution.
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